J&K elections: a qualitative change in voting pattern

By Balraj Puri

Polling in the first two phases of election in Jammu and Kashmir has been very uneven. The first phase covered  Kupwara and Baramulla districts in Kashmir region and Muslim majority districts of Rajouri and Poonch in Jammu region and Kargil in Ladakh region. The polling percentage in these assembly segments ranged from 24,06 per cent in Baramulla to 78.74 per cent in Zanskar segment of Kargil. Within Kashmir region it was highest in Karnah at 70.98 per cent.

In the second phase the range of variation in polling was much larger. It varied from as low as 5 per cent in Srinagar district to 70 per cent in the border constituency in Jammu district. In Kashmir valley it averaged 50 per cent. The overall percentage in the first and second phases is 48 per cent and 42 and respectively.

More significant than the percentage of voters turn out is the fact that none of the major contesting parties has alleged rigging in any constituency or accused the Election Commission and its local machinery of partiality. Not that there were no complaints. But most of them related to constituencies where polling was low and did not materially affect the poll percentage.

The same is true of allegations of coercion by the security forces. Some personnel of the forces might have thought that low percentage of polling was not in the national interest and that it was their “patriotic” duty to use their influence to increase it. But in most cases the effect was exactly opposite to that was intended. Moreover nowhere any body has accused the forces of asking the people to vote for any particular party or candidate. Further one must not dismiss the explanation of Chief Election Commissioner Lyngdoh that “the people use coercion (by the army) as an excuse if they are questioned by militants for voting”.

In no case coercion of the army is even a fraction of the violence that has been used by the militants to prevent people from voting. They have killed two candidates and scores of political workers and their relatives. They threatened any body who dared cast a vote.

However, all those who voted are not pro-India. Nor all those who abstained are pro-Azadi. Those who took the courage to participate in the election process have clearly voted for democracy and against the use of violence for achieving whatever objective they had in mind. Even those who are still committed for azadi have realised that the role of gun for its achievement is over. In fact this realisation is widely shared by the people and pro-azadi leaders.

The Pakistan government did not read the current popular thinking on the subject when it condemned the election in advance as farce and after first phase declared it as sham. The militant groups too were out of tune with the reality in Kashmir when they exhorted the Hurriyat to boycott the election. The Hurriyat leaders were forced to retort that they would not accept outside diktates. Eventually they did decide against participation but did not effectively campaign for boycott. In fact most of the time during election campaign, they were outside the state. They and Shabir Shah also remained engaged in talks with official and non-official interlocutors from Delhi on possible terms for participation in election. But these talks remained inconclusive.

If the talks were really intended to involve all separatist groups in the elections, there must have been started much earlier. Or these groups should have plunged into elections without any talks and understanding with the Government of India and without giving up their objective. As the option of gun is closing, due to changes in international situation and compulsion of General Musharraf, and in any case the gun is no longer under the control of the political leaders, their only option was democratic political struggle of which election could be an important part. After all Congress party contested elections in 1937 and formed government in seven provinces without giving up its objective of freedom. The pro-azadi sections of the people have taken a more realistic view of the situation than  their leaders. To that extent the separatist leadership stands isolated from the people.

Others who opted for participation in election are those who are convinced that its day-to-day problems - administrative injustices and excesses, unemployment, corruption, nepotism and unaccountable governance - are no less, if not more, important than azadi. They would not like to wait - God knows for how long - for the final solution of the Kashmir problem, that, too, through violent means, for the solution of these current problems. Nor are they sure if they will be able to rid of these problems when and if they get azadi. The attack on election is thus perceived by them as an attack on their right to choose their representatives to deal with the immediate problems or to raise their voice against the manner in which they are being dealt with.

Another section of the people is convinced that call for boycott to vote in fact implies a vote for perpetuation of the present regime. Those who are fed up with the way they have been governed and want to change their rulers or at least some checks on their absolute powers are prepared to take any risk for casting their votes. They are equally disillusioned with the “boycott” leadership who according to them indirectly ensures the continuation of the present rulers to be in power.

Finally there is indeed a hard core of committed Indians in Kashmir who are genuinely convinced that the best interests of the state lies in continuation of its relations with India. Thus election has brought together those who want azadi through democratic means, those who are more concerned with day-to-day problems and those who are against perpetuation of the present regime and the genuine Indian patriots in Kashmir. They have got an opportunity to interact or confront one another but in a democratic framework. They will also share the assembly forum with the emerging forces from Jammu and Ladakh who include voices of protest. The ruling National Conference, for instance, faces complete rout in Ladakh and is expected to be cut to size in Jammu also. This internal dialogue is a pre-requisite for the success of any bilateral - between separatist leaders and the Government of India - or trilateral - which includes Pakistan - that is often proposed for the final and lasting solution of Kashmir problem.

However, this process of dialogue should not exclude those who have not participated in the election. They certainly include those who do not believe in democratic methods to achieve azadi. But let them not delude themselves by believing that all those who did not vote belong to the azadi camp. For there is no election in which polling is cent percent; except in totalitarian societies. For a variety of reasons people are unable or unwilling to vote. There are also a large number of people who believed that security of life was more important than exercising their right to vote. The fate of those who had defied the directive of the militants was enough to deter most of the people with normal courage.

Some boycotted because they believed, on experience, that elections could not be fair under the National Conference regime. Then there are people who regard poll boycott as a legitimate means of protest. A number of Kashmiri Pandit organisations boycotted the polling to register their protest against the way they had been treated ever since they had to migrate from Kashmiri in 1990. In many parts of the state, people are reported to have said “why should we vote? Our lot has not improved since independence”. None of them wanted azadi.

Thus both the camps - participants and non-participants in the election - include a mixed bag. Of course a significant increase in the number of former marks a qualitative change in the situation.

*The writer is a veteran political analyst based in Jammu.

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