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LARGEST
CIRCULATED ENGLISH MONTHLY OF J&K
A News Magazine of Kashmiri Pandit Community |
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| | Home | August 1st-31st, 1999 | |
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VOL. 5, NO: 13-14 Part 1 of 2 Go to Part 2 of 2 EDITORIALOPERATION MUSHTARITHE descalation of War in Kargil has been followed by the worsening of the groundsituation in the Kashmir Valley. Terrorist groups have begun taking on paramilitary forces and army directly. During the last 10 days there have been more than 15 attacks on the camps of security forces, resulting in more than 30 deaths of the security personnel. These attacks had an element of surprise and point that the ISI has been able to build a highly efficient underground command structure for subversion. Planting of car bombs and IEDs have become a common occurence even in the high security zones of Srinagar city. Convoys of armed forces are being targetted under a definite plan. Counter-insurgents’ and political activists’ killings have also seen a sharp increase. Reports say that during the last two months ISI has pushed more than 2000 mercenaries into the Kashmir Valley, while another 3000 have been massed along the border for infiltration. It would be naive to think that the escalation of terrorist violence is simply aimed at disrupting the election process or is an act of desperation on the part of Pakistan in the aftermath of debacle in Kargil. A close look on the operation topac reveals that the new qualitative upgradation represents a higher phase i.e., Zarb-e-Kamil/ Operation Mushtari Phase. The main features of this higher phase have been outlined as repeating Kargil type intrusions in different parts of J&K to occupy lateral valleys, engaging Indian armed forces directly to create multiple fronts within, use of remote controlled land mines to make highways and movement of security forces unsafe etc. Pakistan under a plan is raising the political and military cost for India in this proxy-war. There are three imperatives for India to counter this Operation Mushtari. One to stop the infiltration of subversives from across the border. It means creating a 5 kilometer seucirty belt with effective mining of the borders. Second the strategic protection of the highways. And lastly the element of surprise has to be snatched from the terrorists. India must go on offensive against the foreign mercenaries on the pattern followed by Britishers in their Malaya campaign. Any dithering on these imperatives can be highly deterimental for our security stakes in Jammu and Kashmir. Minorities in J&KEVOLVE A ‘DOCTRINE OF SURVIVAL’By Dr. Ajay ChrangooSECESSIONISM IN BORDER STATESThe secessionist movements have been the characteristic of only the borderstates in India. And without exception such states either have a non-Hindu population as the majority social group or the dominant Hindu identity has suffered a crippling erosion over the years. The importance of the absence of secessionist tendencies in the main heartland in maintaining the Unity of India cannot be overemphasised. The political culture as has evolved in the mainland India has in many ways than one contributed to the growth of secessionism in the border states as also the marginalisation and exclusion of Hindu minority groups living there. While as the growth of separatism in North-Eastern states can be mainly attributed to socio-economic reasons as will as concerted campaigns to bring about dilution and cultural alienation of Hindu social groups, same does not hold true for the growth of secessionism in the northern border states of Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir. The patronisation and legitimisation by the Indian State and the mainstream political establishment of the religious-subnationalism in these two states has created a situation where secessionist politics has assumed international ramifications and an intense war from within. CLEANSING OPERATIONS IN J&KThe dimensions of this internal war have frightening proportionsparticularly in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Hindu minority in this border state has borne the main brunt of this war. Suffering a systematic process of ruthless marginalisation and exclusion since independence, the Hindus in the Jammu and Kashmir State are now face to face with an attrition of genocidal proportions. Terrorist operatives in this state, unlike Punjab, are of the nature of a demographic assault. Indian State as well as political mainstream have yet to acknowledge this stark reality. Kashmir valley has already been cleansed of its Hindu population. Continuing massacres of the Hindus in Jammu province are neither a diversionary tactic employed by the terrorists nor a sign of their desperation under the supposed pressure mounted by the security forces. They have a very clear cut objective of bringing about a blatant demographic change not just in some parts, but in the entire Jammu region. ‘Cleansing operations’ in the form of selective or mass killings of Hindus form only the obvious component of the demographic assault in the state. The less talked about, but not so hidden, components are engineered purchase of land and properties in targeted areas of Jammu region, fraudulent and illegal grab of Hindu properties and most significantly the demographic invasion, of Jammu city. Creating a ‘New Jammu City’ with a transformed demographic profile, relegating the existing city to the backyards, is no longer being talked in hushed tones. These demographic campaigns besides being crucial to the Islamisation of the state to facilitate extension of Muslim power further towards east have also immediate implications. Such machinations narrow down the social support base for India in the state, thus critically impairing the leverage of the Nation in any negotiated settlement in the light of mounting international pressures to settle the Kashmir issue. Efforts of the entire nation to stand up to concerted international pressures on the Kashmir issue stand nullified in the long run if the demographic character of the state is allowed to be transformed at a pace at which it is happening in the present time. Dispersal of displaced Kashmiri Pandits from Jammu to other parts of the country, regular internal displacement of Hindus from the vulnerable border areas of Jammu province to smaller towns as well as the main Jammu city should ring the alarm bills loud enough for evolving a more comprehensive thinking on the issue. Strategic thinking should take a serious notice of the fact that even though Indian security prowess may be able to enforce a status quo on the borders but as a result of this blatant change of demographic profile of the state the borders of the nation are very in-conspicuously receeding back. RESPONSE OF INDIAN STATEThe response of the Indian State to this serious development since 1989 canbe at the most termed as an approach of mere ‘physical retention’ of Hindus. The main features of this policy of retention are that: i) it seeks to maintain pluralism in the state only in symbolic terms. Attempts at the phased return of the displaced Hindus is a classical example of this symbolism. ii) it ignores the reality that Hindus in the state in general, and in vulnerable pockets were they are having not a significant presence in particular, are the basic targets of destabilisation. iii) attacks on Hindus in the state continue to be visualised in terms of attempts to vitiate communal atmosphere in the mainland rather than in terms of effecting a demographic transformation of that particular area and pushing back the civilisational frontiers of the nation. iv) it seeks to discourage fresh displacement only through administrative coercion in the form of presenting a fiat accompli to the victims that displacement may bring a worse situation of economic ruin and wilderness. The victim is presented a choice between devil and the deep sea. It is no exaggeration that Hindus in Jammu
and Kashmir constitute the SURVIVAL DOCTRINEIt is time that problems of minorities in the State of the J&K are addressednot in piecemeals and puny political posturings. Indian State can no longer afford to shy away from evolving a comprehensive ‘Doctrine of Survival’ for minorities in the Jammu and Kashmir State. Any delay in its formulation may only imperil the minorities with serious implications for overall security integrity and stability of the already weakened northern frontiers of the Indian nation. This security Doctrine should form one of the main components of India’s Kashmir policy and should be based on the specific threats to the minorities in the regions of the state they inhabit. It also should take into account the role of political elites in the state towards the survival and development of the minorities. The main presumptions for this security doctrine have to be as: a) No
protection measure for the minorities under assault in the state can The father of the nation had opined
helplessly in 1934 that a Hindu prince TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING THE WARBy Dr Ajay ChrungooKARGIL intrusion has raised an array of fundamental questions about thefunctioning of our intelligence set up, strategic thinking to political decision making. Terms of reference of the Committee declared by the Prime Minister to go into the various aspects of Kargil intrusion are broad enough to answer these questions. Only if the committee applies itself with integrity and the political leadership plays just a facilitator’s role. However the process of such an introspection may still fall short of the desired objectives of making nation wiser to evolve a comprehensive response to the Pak mechinations. The reason is the reluctance which the Indian nation state has been showing in qualifying the ‘war form’ Pakistan has unleashed. The nation has to come to terms with this ‘war form’ if the aftermath of Kargil intrusion, which marked the upgradation of Pakistani agression at all levels, is to be handled properly. WAR FORM AND DEFECTIVE STRATEGIC PARADIGMThe commonly used terminogologies for the Pakistani aggression of variousforms during last decade have been ‘Proxy-war’ and ‘undeclard war’. Prox-war term, which is more commonly used, squarely fails to qualify the nature of this war because it creates a misleading impression about the instrumentalities used in this war. The human factor involved through such a qualification, becomes an element devoid of any will, conviction as well as independence of action. Focus remains primarily on the external element. The ‘undeclared war’ terminology is also grossly inadequate, but does at least qualify one attribute of the ‘war form’ which is that the initiator of the aggression maintains a leverage of deniability and never formally owns the responsibility for the aggression. Both the nomenclatures are the product of the extant strategic paradigm of a low-intensity conflict which is neither able to perceive the gradual upgradation of the aggression at various levels from within nor visualise and pre-empt the quantum leap in the conflict from without. These commonly used qualifications of Pakistani war also do not encompass the various components of the aggression as well as its objectives long term or short term. In the aftermath of Kargil intrusion the experts on strategic concerns however, appear to be getting conscious of the limitations of the existing paradigm on security issues. They have infact become highly critical of it. ‘A Kashmir policy must be invented supported by an operational doctrine that will persuade Pakistan to respect the ‘sanctity of LoC’, comments major Gen. Ashok Mehta a military expert of repute. Another analyst on strategic affairs Raja Menon reflects similar concerns while trying to explain reasons for Kargil intrusion. “A range of faulty signals from India created not so much by bad nuclear strategy but absence of any strategy conventional or nucler”. QUALIFICATION OF THE WAR FORMThe deputy director of Institute of Defense studies and Analyses C. UdayBhaskar, one of the best known defense experts, describes the complexity of the war by Pakistan in Kashmir as, “Kashmir symbolises a large range of issues including terrorism, low-intensity coflict, concept of Jehad, Islamic terror and also the patterns of ISI’s destablising designs in different parts of our country.” This statement, even though a little overlapping in its content, takes into account the broadest spectrum of attributes of the Paki-war. More specifically the Pakistani aggression against our nation for last two decades constitutes three forms of assaults-subversive, demographic and territorial. The distinguished political scientist from Kashmir, Prof. MK Teng hits the core of the issue when he describes the undeclared war as the ‘War of Subversion’. The aftermath of Kargil intrusion provides the defense and strategic analysts of our country a very conducive national environment to go into various aspects of the failure which led to the intrusion in Kargil. It also provides a very excellant and crucial opportunity to understand the nature of the war being waged by Pakistan in its totality. Kargil intrusion constituted the interplay of all the three forms of assaults-subversive, demographic and territorial. Before the intrusion we have seen the interplay and impact of only the subversive and demographic assaults. Inspite of the much drummed up Shia-Sunni divide a very significant part of the logistics for the Kargil intrusion was provided by the subversives within. Kargil crisis had also a very significant implication of rendering the security and manitainance of Kargil town untenable creating the potential for a severe demographic pressure on the Buddhist majority Leh. The territorial implications of the intrusion have been throughly debated and the dangers to entire Ladakh region highlighted. The atypicality of the military operations in Kargil have been summed up by another expert on strategic analyses Sh Sreedhar, “for the first time in post independence India, the armed forces are fighting two types of armies of Pakistan. It is becoming clear that Pakistan’s regular army from Northern Light Infantry Divisiion is in action. At another level the Indian army is also fighting a regular-irregular army raised by Pakistan during the last two decades.” WAR OF SUBVERSION-ATTRIBUTESThe war by Pakistan as already discussed comprises of three main components- subversive, demographic and territorial. However, the subversive component constitutes core of the entire ‘war form’. a) Basic objective:- Basic objective of this war form is purely ideological. Pakistan is an ideological state with a proclaimed incompatibility with Indian nation state. This incompatibality is not Kashmir specific as commonly believed. Kashmir is only an alibi for expansion of Muslim power towards east taking the entire Himayalan barrier into its fold to ultimately overwhelm India. The Comments of one of the leading authorities on contemporary Islam John Laffin should make our strategic analysts stand up and ponder, while they formulate approaches to deal with the Pakistani aggression. Laffin says, “The Sunni Muslim code of civil legislation according to Hanfi School of Islamic Law expresses the matter clearly. The Jehad is the normal and permanent state of war between the Muslims and the people of Dar-al-Harb, the code points out. It can end only with domination over the unbelievers and the absolute supermacy of Islam throughout the world. All war like acts are permitted on the territory of the infidels ... As it is not feasible to fight against all the infidel people simultaneously, Jehad allows for the eventuality of a provisional suspension of hostilities. Such unavoidable truces constitute another form of holy war for they serve to reinforce the military potential of Darul-Islam.” b) Interim objectives:- This war of subversion, conditioned by its basic objectives, has interim objectives. The major flaw in our national discourse on security issues is that it continues to be territory centric. For an unconventional war we have been applying a conventional approach. This paradigm has lead to our failure to appreciate the non-territorial objectives of Pakistani aggresson in general and Kargil intrusion in particular. Strategic thinkers within this country and outside have regarded Kargil intrusion as a high quality military operation of ‘ingenuity’. Tony Clifton who had reported 1971 war between India and Pakistan on both sides comments, “Ironically it has really been a brilliant operation on the part of the Pakistanis, but they can never say so, that is horribly for their morale.” Indian military experts have also openly complimented this operation from the point of view of military standards. Ironically there is a simplistic generalisation being offered in this country that the Pakistani think tank behind Kargil Operation was surprised by the high intensity response from India. We are spending two crores a day for defending a very remote area of Ladakh - the Siachin Glacier, and even had successfully repelled more than a dozen bids to capture it in the year preceeding Lahore diplomacy. Yet we tend to believe that on the other side people were stupid enough not to judge our reaction even when the entire Srinagar-Leh axis was being jeopardised. It is time our strategic analysts accord due respectibility to such objectives of Kargil intrusion which have been articulated but only in a way that they appear to be incidental to the main objective of endangering the entire Ladakh region. These objectives are essentially non-territorial from the short term perspective. For example through the operation in Kargil, besides inflicting a heavy cost on India Pakistan has also probed various strategic thresholds. Specifically Kargil intrusion has lowered the threshold for international intervention and at the same time raised the threshold of Indian conventional reponse.But more importantly the intrusion has aimed to create a favourable environment for Dilution of Indian Sovereignty in Jammu and Kashmir. In the prelude to Kargil intrusion Pakistan’s support to district-wise plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir state and almost simultaneous floating of proposals for reorganising the Indian part of Jammu and Kashmir on communal lines with Indian control only on three subjects of defence, communication and foreign affairs, are perhaps not incidental happenings. During as well as after the Kargil operation we are witnessing the veering round of the so called moderate liberal opinion both in Pakistan and India around various variants of the Dixon-Plan advocated vigorously by US think tanks on Kashmir. Pakistani analyst Ayaz Amir’s remarks in Dawn provide a critical insight which is worth consideration. He while making a critical apprisal of Pakistani operation says, “to put the most charitable construction on what is going on in Kargil sector, if this was the opening move in a bid to liberate Kashmir by force, something could be said in its defence. It would be seen as part of a larger scheme of things even if this larger scheme was decried as foolish or foolhardy. But unless there are higher secrets yet to be revealed, the fighting in Kargil appear to stand all by itself... A war or even fighting of a limited kind as we are seeing in theKargil and Drass sectors, must have a political objective if the expenditure of blood and resources is to be justified. What is the political objective of the present fighting? It cannot be the conqest or liberation of Kashmir because we lack the strength for that. It cannot be the desire to internationalise the Kashmir problem because it is a quixotic venture to risk a war for so paltry aim.” Strategic security paradigm in India has to assimilate the fact that most important interim objective of ‘war of subversion’ in Jammu and Kashmir by Pakistan is the Dilution of Indian Sovereignty over the state. Also what we are witnessing in the entire state is not a territorial surgery but territorial dissolution. Relentless Demographic assault has considerably narrowed down Indian social base in the state. This loss of demographic leverage is aimed to facilitate the process of territorial dissolution to critical levels where the front either will not exisit or there will be fronts all around. c) Response Control:- ‘War of Subversion’ through its subversive process has created, sustained and perpetuated a reference frame work in our counry which is crucial for its continuance and attainment of objectives. The contradictions between various nation building approaches in India are being used as the operating space . Military experts in India now admit that even without territorial gains Pakistani operations have attained a ‘strategic depth.’ With the upgradation of various components of Pakistani aggression, subversive assault has assumed a critical dimension which if not controlled can be catastrophic. Upgradation in subversion has further brought about a qualitative deterioration in the existing refrence framework of Indian responses. For example before 1989 and forced exodus of Kashmiri Pandits, secular approach of various political regimes in valley was judged not by the secular content of their politics but by their approach towards accession with India. After 1989, the demographic composition of the exodus became the hall mark of the state of secular affairs. In recent times the pressures of subversion have pushed the secular paradigm to rediculous cliches. Symbolic return of Pandits gave away to the tourism returning to valley as the basic parameter of the status of secularism in the valley. Theories of ‘alienation’ have helped in the dangerous internalisation of the crisis. Everything that happens gets attributed to the failures of the state thereby creating more alienation. Most dangerous implication of the subversive processes is their success in forcing a process of self-disinformation upon the Indian state. Kargil intrusion becomes a fallout of returning tourism and normalcy in the valley. And intensification of violence in the valley becomes a fallout of Kargil intrusion. Massacres in Jammu become a result of desperation of terrorists in the valley and the massacres in valley an outcome of their desperation in Jammu. Nation appears to have entered a vicious cycle of self-delusion and self-mortification. d) International Environment:- The ‘war of subversion’ is operating in a conducive international environment of unipolarity. India continues to be seen as a part of the other pole of the bipolar era which was dismantled. The international environment has restricted the healthy expression of our sovereignity. Kargil war took place on the terms and conditions of the enemy which we could not alter because of our continued isolation on strategic matters. The ‘war of subversion’ by Pakistan should be seen in complementary relations rather than contridiction with the international opinion which has restricted the expression of Indian sovereignity. American and western endorsement of Indian point of view came as late as when most of the military objectives were achieved by Indian forces at a very heavy cost. The belated support to Indian position in Kargil has not to be visualised as veering round of US and west to Indian view on Kashmir but only in the context of forestalling any new regional alignments. “No less extremist ones are those who have somehow convinced themselves that America’s abhorrrence of Islamic fundamentalism combined with terrorism, more particularly the nefarious activities of Osma Bin Laden, the growing attraction of Indian market and the realisation that in the Asian balance of power India matters, the US is now ready for a breakthrough in Indo-US relations even at the cost of its long term alliance with Pakistan”, these words of caution by Inder Malhotra are fully justified. The interim objective of dilution of sovereignty in Indian Kashmir of the ‘war of subversion’ by Pakistan is in perfect harmony with the positions taken by US and west on Kashmir. The vision of Asia in 21st century as revealed by the Pantagon Papers envisages creation of an Independent Kashmir. There are concrete reasons to believe that this vision has not been as yet disowned by the US Government. e) Economic support:- The war type by Pakistan is supported both by legal as well as illegal economy. Overemphasis on the state of affairs of official Pak economy may lead us to faulty conclusions. Illegal economy derived from the over all control of drug traffiking in particular and crime Mafias in general form the core of the support base of this ‘war of subversion’. It is mind-boggling that equal amount of Pakistan’s GDP in 1997-98-Rs 2,750 million was generated by the parallel economy. Sums generated by smuggling are at the disposal of armed forces and spending Rs 100 million or so for a Kargil type operation is not a problem. BEYOND KARGILThe realisation of the totality of the war by Pakistan is a pre-requisite incombating it. Approaches of self mortification have lead to the internalisation of the problems which Pakistan has created. Approaches of externalisation have to be part of the future operational doctrine. National sensitivity to Pakistani designs should not be only territorial. Subversive and demographic assaults are as crucial as the terrotorial one. Nation has to develop a threshold for these assault forms as well and let it be known to the world. There in lies the key to contain and defeat this agression. ‘OPERATION TURTUK’KARGIL ADVENTURE: DESTINATION WAS SIACHENSpecial CorrespondentTurtuk is the strategic underbelly of Siachen, being sandwiched between theNorthern areas of PoK and Aksai Chin/Karakoram frontier on the east. Over two-thirds of the route to Turtuk is the same as that for Siachen. Any Pakistani advance down the Shyok valley would put pressure on the flanks of the Siachen route. Also, Pakistani pressures in the Turtuk sector could have them control over the high altitude Thoise airbase and open up the possibility of establishing a direct axis to Batalik (via Chorbatla) and from there on to Kargil. Turtuk was captured by the Indian Army in the 1971 war under the leadership of Col Chewang Rinchin. Under Simla agreement it was delineated with India. Kargil aggression by Pakistan was a grand design to incorporate Turtuk and its adjoining areas. This has been confirmed from the interrogation of the arrested militants, who revealed that Pakistan had planned to execute ‘Operation Turtuk’. By occupying Turtuk and its adjacent areas, Pakistan wanted to make India’s retention of Siachen untenable. Pakistan has an obsession that occupation of Siachen by Indian troops threatens the Sino-Pak Karakoram Highway, which is actually at a distance of 180 km from the Siachen across severely broken terrain. In 1983 intelligence reports had warned India of Pak preparations to occupy the Siachen area. This move was forestalled by Indian troops in April 1984. They swiftly occupied the dominating heights and important passes on the Saltoro ridgeline. India fears that occupation of Siachen by Pakistan would provide an opportunity to Pakistan and China to operate in collusion and threaten Northern Ladakh. It is in this context that some seasoned Indian military experts have been talking of Chinese collusion in the Kargil aggression by Pakistan. “The airborne troop concentration and force accretion in Skardu point to a larger sinister design.. to grab a large area,” said the Director-General of Military Operations at a press-briefing in early June. Three-Phase Plan: Informed sources reveal that Pakistan’s Kargil game-plan was to be accomplished in three-phases. In the first phase, it attempted to weaken Kashmir’s link with Ladakh. Its intrusion in Drass was aimed to cut Ladakh’s supply lines from the Kashmir valley through the Zojila pass. Simultaneously Pakistan was making concerted efforts to entrench itself along the fulcrum of Chorbatla and Turtuk, northeast of Kargil. Pakistan was putting intense pressure on Battalik. Through its strategic hold on Battalik it could drive a wedge between north and south of the Indus. Pakistan would then have been in a position to delink the Kargil brigade, which looks after the area from two other brigades located to the north of the Indus. Chorbatla and Turtuk area, located north and north-east of the Indus, would be isolated. Having isolated the Chorbatla-Turtuk alignment from Batalik, Pakistan wanted to mount pressure on the Indian brigade at Chalunka on the river Shyok. Positioning of Pakistan’s forces along the Chorbatla-Turtuk sector also threatens India’s defence of Siachen Glacier on two counts. First, the pressure on the Chalunka brigade can mean the diversion of troops from the Siachen brigade headquarter at Partapur. This could result in lower concentration of forces for Siachen’s defence. Secondly, Pakistani troops at Chorbatla can hit the supply lines of the southern Siachen glacier. This can effect the Indian weapon and ammunition reserves for this segment. The second phase of Pakistani gameplan was to follow once consolidation in the Chorbatla-Turtuk area was complete. Pakistan then would have a good chance of fighting their way along the descent of the Shyok valley, overrun Thoise and sit at Khalsar on the junction of the Nubra and Shyok rivers. Any Pak consolidation at Khalsar would result in squeeze on the glacier since troops from Khalsar can be sent through the Nubra river, whose source lies in the Siachen glacier itself. In the phase three Pakistan intended to build pressure on Leh after the takeover of Khalsar. Entrenchment in Khalsar would make the road link between Leh and Kargil quite vulnerable through a pincer movement. While one body of troops advances from the Khalsar side, another force cuts through the Batalik alignment. The Pakistani objective for threatening Leh was two-fold a) capture Siachen-Turtuk-Kargil tract b) bargain in overall Kashmir settlement. Some arrested militants have as per media reports, revealed that Pakistan’s operation Turtuk was to be executed in four phases. In the Phase-I, the Pakistani Army had decided to infiltrate the area through militants in order to subvert the locals and initiate insurgency. This would be followed by the launching of operations to occupy critical areas around Turtuk and the adjacent areas. The logistics would be maintained by helicopters, with temporary helipads built across the LoC. An Army spokesman claimed that in the third phase Pakistan Army was to launch heliborne operations in the rear areas, to facilitate operations of the advancing ground forces. The last phase was to declare Turtuk and its adjacent areas, as part of their Northern areas. “Operation Turtuk”: Pakistan began implementing its ‘Operation Turtuk’ plan in 1994, when it hooked Ibrahim, a native of Turtuk. Ibrahim had been working as an undercover agent for the Intelligence Bureau. He crossed over to Pok with his family and got arms training at Hizbul Mujahideen centre in Skardu. ISI made him HM chief in Turtuk. In 1996, he is reported to have sent six local boys for arms training. Intelligence reports say that most of Turtuk population got training through Ibraham. He has now turned out to be a major conduit of arms and ammunition in Turtuk. Ibraham had stored these arms and sophisticated communication equipment stealthily at hill tops and in walls of houses and some religious places, to be used when Pakistan would give a go ahead signal. It was come to light that Pakistan had planned a major “mass” insurgency in the villages along the LoC, with Ibrahim running the show. Earlier intelligence reports had said that several young men of the border villages had crossed over to Skardu in PoK for arms training spread over several weeks. The arrest of 24 people hailing from the border villages of Thang, Tyakshi, Pachathang and Turtuk in the first fortnight of June by Leh police virtually created a sensation. It revealed much than was known about the ramifications of Pak subversion in Ladakh. The conspiracy came to light with the arrest of Ibrahim’s brother, Ali Bhutto. The police also seized a large cache of sophisticated arms and ammunition, including 25 AK-47 and 56 rifles, one LMG, one MMG, plastic explosive, one rocket launcher, three rockets, 15 hand grenades, three batteries, fuse wire and a sniper rifle. Most of the subversives arrested were in the age group 20-25, while a few were in their 40s. Significantly all the arrested people used to act as porters of Army and they were paid fake Indian currency between Rs 2000 to Rs 5000 by Pakistan. What is alarming is that these young men after receiving arms training in PoK would infiltrate the ranks of the armed forces, state police and other civilian agencies. Leh police arrested two constables-Mohammed Ali and Ahmed Shah from Thang village. The two are said to have been involved in hiding some of the arms and ammunition brought in by Ibrahim. According to police, Mohd Ali had been to PoK for training in 1997 before joining the force. Ibrahim would be in constant touch, as per reports, with his relatives and friends in Turtuk and other villages. He came often to the Indian side to meet them and supply them with arms. Among the arrested people were also an employee of Food and Supplies department-Abdul Hamid. The busting of this subversive group is significant. How did Ibrahim manage to infiltrate so much arms, ammunition and sophisticated communication equipment onto the Indian side without catching the eye of security forces? Why did people in Turtuk fall in Pakistan’s trap? People of Turtuk have the highest literacy among the surrounding villages. It has the maximum percentage of State government jobs in the entire Nubra valley. Turtuk always received the best attention of the State government. Whenever the Chief Minister visited Leh or Nubra, he made it a point to visit Turtuk. Obviously there was no scope of any alienation. And surprisingly, it were the illiterate Turtuk shepherds who were the first to report the presence of Pak intruders in the mountains. Also arrests in Turtuk have brought to attention the presence of “double agents” in the border areas of Ladakh district. Earlier, in Drass, radio intercepts made at the Army’s ‘Tropo Radio Intercepting Station’ ascertained the presence of torchmen. In Drass a mysterious torch light would be switched on and off from a remote village to direct Pakistan shelling on targets on Indian side. In Kargil also the Army and the police were baffled by the Pakistani shelling knocking out vital targets frequently and so accurately. Targets chosen were also significant-underground ammunition dump on Baru hills, residence of SP, and DC, office of SP, offices of ration and clothing depot, fuel dump of Border Roads Organisation (BRO) at Khurbatang Plateau. It was so badly damaged that it had to be shifted to Kargil. The shells also hit the office of ITBP. After the police launched an investigation, it found 20 local spies were directing the Pakistani firing from this side of the border. And most of them turned out to be Observation Posts (OPs) sources for various Indian intelligence outfits, double crossing the Indian agencies. The porters involved in the game would gather information about locations and in turn supplied it to Pakistan enabling it to go for its targets accurately. A special police team nabbed Ghulam Mohammad, a school teacher and Hassan, an army labourer on charges of spying in Batalik along with eight bundles of dynamite and two metres of special detonator wire, called cordex. A mole in the local telephone exchange was found directing the Pakistani shelling. END KARGIL INTRUSION - WAS IT PLAN - XSpecial CorrespondentIn 1987, immediately afterthe Exercise Brass Tacks, Pakistan governmentasked its Joint Chief of Staff Committee (JCSC) to Siachen glacier. After prolonged deliberations, JCSC submitted a comprehensive plan to make India recoil from the Saltoro crestline and Siachen glacier. The aim of this operation, codenamed Plan - X, was to seize and hold logistics support bases vital for maintenance of troops deployed on theSaltoro Crest Line, Siachen and Southern Glaciers by surprise attck with a view of trapping all Indian troops deployed in the glacier areas and enabling Pakistan to negotiate withdrawl of Indian forces from Siachen Glacier from a position of strength. The details of this plan were published in a leading Indian defence Journal in 1992. Plan - X visualised capture of forward positions of Partapur garrison along axis Siari-Tortuk and logistic support bases for Southern Glaciers by infiltration across the LC, capturing Thoise Air field Complex and Siachen base camp through heli-landing of troops, simulation of major attacks in Drass, Kargil, Tangdhar, Pooch to tie down Indan reserve formations and stepping up terrorist and guerrilla activity in the Kashmir Valley. Plan - X was shelved because of the prolongation of Taliban war in Afghanistan and Benazir government appeared to be totally against such military adventure in Siachen. Some Pakistani Generals did not agree with Benazir in postponement of Plan - X. They took India’s support to Dr Najilbullah’s regime in Afghanistan as an excuse to attack Siachen. On a note of prophetic warning, the author of ‘OP. Topac-Kashmir imbroglio’ warned, “these Generals may not have their way immediately but it cannot be assumed that they will not have their way in the future”. END KARGIL: THE WIDER RAMIFICATIONSBy Shailendra AimaThe wider conflict in Kargil seems to be over with the withdrawal ofPakistan troops and the mercenaries backed by it. The political observers as well as the strategic analysts have heaved a sigh of relief at the averting of a full-fledged military conflict between India and Pakistan, with a possible nuclear fall out in South Asia. There is a talk, now, of conflict resolution on bilateral basis in the spirit of the Simla Agreement. An opinion seems to be gaining ground that the support to the militants from across the border must stop forthwith. Another premise which is getting projected simultaneously is that LoC be converted into International Border, that the long standing promise of autonomy of Kashmiris be fulfilled and that movement of Kashmiris from the Indian to Pakistani side, and vice versa, be liberalised. It seems that the entire solution, in this case, hinges on the assumption that the bone of contention between India and Pakistan is Kashmir and once there is a resolution of the Kashmir problem, the hostilities between the neighbours will cease and that peace shall prevail in the sub-continent, giving both India and Pakistan the opportunities to utilise their resources on development and economic growth. An analysis of the claims and counter-claims of both India and Pakistan in the matter shows the Pakistani belief that a logical conclusion of the two nation theory (the basis for Pakistan’s creation) should have been accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan; it being a Muslim majority state. The Pakistanis also demand that Kashmiris be given the right of self-determination, as proposed by no less a person than Pt. Jawahar Lal Nehru. The Pakistanis also say that the denial of the right of self-determination amounts to suppression of the people of Kashmir and therefore it shall continue to support popular movements against India in Kashmir. The argument put forth by the Indians is that the state of Jammu and Kashmir legally and constitutionally acceded to India when it was facing an aggression by the Pakistani regulars and its sponsored tribesmen. That plebiscite became impossible when Pakistan refused to vacate one third of Kashmir’s territory and that the people of Kashmir put their stamp of approval on accession by electing a popular government, by participating in elections from time to time and by the Resolutions of their Constituent Assembly. The Indians also argue that India is a secular state and the fact that India has a much larger Muslim population than the entire Pakistan, negates the two nation theory. For India, therefore, Pakistan is the product of a two-nation theory which it refutes and debunks; and for Pakistan, Kashmir is a logical corollary and continuation of the process of the two nation theory. In addition to these claims and counter-claims, there is a need to understand the nature of conflict between India and Pakistan. Creation of Bangladesh was a serious physical as well as an ideological setback to Pakistan. Ever since then, it renewed its attempts to annex Kashmir and to weaken the multiethnic, multilingual and secular fabric of the Indian polity. This would serve to avenge Bangladesh as well as to weaken the ideological basis of the Indian nation state. Pakistan after the 1971 experience started banking more on subversive, diplomatic and political machinations to achieve this end. As a consequence India is face to face with a proxy-war not only in Jammu and Kashmir, but through a strong network of ISI operatives, is being pounded in entire north-east and as far south as Tamil Nadu. The reverberations of Punjab are still producing tremors, not to speak of what is happening in Bombay, Coimbatore, Chennai, Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh. As a diplomatic and strategic initiative, Pakistan provided a no-hold, free landing to the Americans for intervention in Afghanistan and diverted its spill-over to Kashmir. A low-cost involvement for Pakistan has developed into a festering sore for the Indian body politic and is demanding a heavy price. A pan-Islamic Jihad serves the imperialist as well as religio-civilisational imperatives of Pakistan and provides it an ideological basis for existence. Emboldened by these ventures, Pakistan visualizes itself as the eastern arm of the Afro-Arab Islamic fraternity with a well defined agenda of expansion in India and further eastward. The Himalayas and the Himalayan hinterland are crucial to its strategic and global interests. An so is its nuclear and missile programme. What happened in Kargil, therefore, is neither an isolated event nor any kind of a misadventure by Pakistan. The only difference this time is that India chose to confront it with its full might and the Pakistanis were made to vacate this side of the LoC. As the reports suggest, the Pakistanis during this period have succeeded in infiltrating about 1600 hard-core Islamic mercenaries into Kashmir who have renewed their attacks on the security establishments in J&K as well as selective minority killings. While the proxy-war stands upgraded, Pakistan is also renewing its peace offensive. It is expressing itself to talk to India for a final solution of the Kashmir problem and also regrets India’s putting preconditions for such talks. India on the other hand, struck up with a mid-term poll, finds its political leadership divided and the entire opposition demanding its pound of flesh. India moves into elections with prospects of a bloodier terrorists offensive. All claims of normalcy in Kashmir stand falsified, today. Pakistan has relentlessly pursued its agenda over the last two decades. It has achieved a decisive depth within the Indian system through subtle ISI operations. It has succeeded in creating a situation for India where India is engaged in self-containing exercises a situation for India where India is engaged in self-containing exercises at the cost of its own sovereignty. “India shall not cross the LoC even in the wake of grave provocation” reveals the state of Indian mind, where LoC is sacrosanct, granting autonomy to J&K is pious, toeing the American initiatives is a compulsion but where National sovereignty and integrity are matters of compromise. Peace in the present circumstances is impossible. India may decide on quantum of autonomy to J&K state, but that bears no relation to the Pakistani offensive; as it would neither prevent its agents from ethnic-cleansing of the minorities nor shall the militarised pan-Islamic groups relent in their pursuit of Jihad. On the contrary, if the Indian state persists with its misplaced priorities of package and concessions for the so-called “misled youth”, and refuses to acknowledge the war or the proxy-war or the war-like situation (whatever nomenclature it likes to give) and keeps on harping on non-issues like “autonomy”, the days shall no be far away when autonomy for LTTE in Tamil Nadu, Baabar Khalsa in Punjab, Nexalities in Andhra, ULFA in Assam and other militant outfits in Bihar, Nagaland and Tripura shall become inevitable. The time has come to get out of this mind-set, call a spade a spade and demonstrate the eye for an eye approach while dealing with the aggressor. In Kashmir, it is the national sovereignty which is under attack. Either we lose to Pakistani design and disintegrate or we preserve ourselves and defeat the enemy. KARGIL: THRESHOLD OF CRUSADESBy Prof MK TengThe war in Kargil, contrary to the view unexpectedly held by the Indiangovernment and which found favour with those who claimed expertise on Indo-Pakistan relations, was not an isolated eruption of a border conflict or a military expedition of the Pakistan army across the Line of Control. In India, a prismatic sense of self-mortification prevails in the government, as well as in the minds of those who run it that there is always, a cause which has its origin outside the Muslim community for whatever, happens inside its folds. Perhaps, the right of self determination which Pakistan alleged, had been denied to the people of Jammu and Kashmir, was also an alibi, which had its origin in India, and which was perhaps, devised for the convenience of Pakistan. For the fact, that neither the transfer of power in the British India, nor the lapse of the Paramountcy in the States, accepted self-determination for any of the peoples in India: those inhabiting the British India, which was divided and those inhabiting the India of the princely States. Indeed, the partition was a denial of the right of self-determination of the Indian people, who except the Muslims-a small minority in the Indian population, opposed the division of India. For whatever, was accomplished after the partition to locate the blame for the communal divide, the censure fell, partly on the British and partly on the Hindus of India, who were erroneously believed to have determined the policies of the Government of India, providing a clean chit to the Muslim League and the Muslims of India: the real force which brought about the partition of India. Pakistan cried hoarse and rightly that the Muslims in India and not the British had created the Muslim homeland for Pakistan, concieved as a major step in the direction of the freedom of the Muslim Umah. Indeed, the British acted as catalysts. The objective of Pakistan was delineated by the Indian Muslims. Sir Mohammad Iqbal and Mohammad Ali Jinnah provided the ideological content to the Muslim movement for Pakistan, a fact, which is clearly revealed by the correspondence Iqbal had with Jinnah till his death. The major tactical manoeuvre the Direct Action, which overwhelmed the Congress leadership, and brought it down to its knees to accept the partition, was envisaged by the Muslims of India. The British did not divide India. The Muslim of India divided it. Sooner than expected, however, a conscious effort was made, first, to put the blame for the partition of India on the British and after that was achieved, put a part of the blame on the Congress leadership. The Muslims in India could do no wrong, and therefore, they could not be accused of having done the wrong of dividing the country. The Indian perspectives continued to be warbled and the separatist demand for a Muslim majority state of Jammu and Kashmir, to exclude it from the secular constitutional organisation of India on the basis of the Muslim majority character of its population looked for its rationale, not in Muslim communalism, which it blatantly reflected, but in the quest for a sub-national identity which was claimed to represent a secular ideal. Much worse, the long secessionist struggle, spearheaded by the Plebiscite Front, in search for the self-determination of the Muslims, was insistently characterised as a movement which did not support Pakistan and the so-called two-nation theory of the Muslim League. The demand for a second Muslim state of Jammu and Kashmir, which the Plebiscite Front and the other secessionists organisation made, was justified as a secular movement because it did not underline this demand for the accession of the Jammu and Kashmir State to Pakistan, but claimed a second partition of India to create another independent Muslim state of Jammu and Kashmir. After the front leaders formally adorned the garb of secular patriotism in 1975 they were suddenly, hailed as the harbingers of a new age of secular history in India. However, they pursued their own agenda and as Afzal Beg, the President of the Front, had promised his cadres, that the Front would enter the government “to wreck India from within”, they followed their objectives with meticulous care and ruthless effect. The leadership of the militant flanks which launched the war of attrition in the state against India in 1989, came from the two generations of the Muslims, who were socialised to secessionism and Pakistan for two and half decades of the movement led by the Plebscite Front in the State. The Muslim international underlined by the Islamic revolution provided the secessionist movement in the state, with a new basis for pan-Islamic unity and a new thrust for the achievement of the freedom of the Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir. A self conscious Indian leadership, driven by compulsions beyond ordinary human comprehension, sought to camouflage the fundamentalist, communal and separatist content of the Muslim militancy by offering theoratical explanations, like the “alienation syndrome”, “poverty” “unemployment” and of course”, the inducement of Pakistan to misguide the Muslim youth”. The Janata government, which owed much to the most irridentist leadership of the Indian Muslims, for their support in the elections, blamed everyone, except the Muslims, for the militant violence in Kashmir. They blamed the Hindus in Jammu and Kashmir as well as in India for having scuttled the aspirations of the Muslims to autonomy, political participation and economic prosperity. They blamed the successive Congress governments of having rigged the elections in the State to userp political power and oppress the Muslims. The Congress which returned to power after the Janata broke up, gave its own version of the eruption of the Muslim militancy in Kashmir and with an abject sense of self-condemnation, blamed its own leadership of having deprived the Muslims in Kashmir of the autonomy which their illustrious predecssors had promised them. Some of the Congress leaders carried their argument to absurd extremes, claiming that the crusade carried on by the militants and their Muslim supporters in Jammu and Kashmir, did not support the two-nation theory, on which Pakistan was based and the version of the Islamic Revolution the militant regimes in Jammu and Kashmir advocated was basically secular in character, and upheld the “tradition of tolerance and amity”, of the Muslim society in Kashmir. The Congress government indeed, had no qualms to inform the National Human Rights Commission that half a million of Hindus had migrated out of their homes of their own volition, visibly seeking to convince the Commission that the Muslims in Kashmir were in no way involved in the ethnic cleansing of the Hindus from Kashmir. The Congress leaders avoided to refer to the genocide of the Hindus and their ethnic cleansing from Kashmir, lest they be rightly understood or misunderstood for what they said. For a long time, the Indian government and the Indian leadership, reluctantly referred to the complicity of Pakistan in the war of attrition in the State, using vague and often misleading chiches, to evade an indictment of the Muslims whether in Jammu and Kashmir or in Pakistan. The Indian Muslims, who had stakes in the secular integration of the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir in the constitutional organisation of India and who vigorously supported the secularisation of the state and society in the rest of India vigorously aplauded the demand for Islamisation of the State under the garb of its sub-national identity. They insisted upon guarantees to secure the Muslims in India against the religious precedence of the Hindu majority and demanded the enforcement of the right to equality and right to protection against discrimination on the basis of religion. But they opposed the secularisation of the Jammu and Kashmir State and its integration in the Indian political structure. While secularism was necessary to protect the Muslim minority in India, religious precedence of Islam was necessary to protect the Muslims majority in Jammu and Kashmir, the only Muslim majority State in India. The violence, with which the Muslims backed up their demand for Pakistan in 1946, when the League launched the ‘Direct Action’ campaign, was characterised by Jinnah himself as the Muslim struggle for freedom from India. The long war of subversion unleased by Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir, is not different in its objectives as well as its character from the ‘Direct Action’ campaign, which led to the partition of India. The Muslim struggle in Kashmir is relatively a wider phenomenon and involves the commitment of the Muslim international with Pakistan as one of its epicentries to force a second partition on India, and cut off its northern regions, Jammu and Kashmir, followed by the planes of the Punjab and hills of Himachal Pradesh and make way for the Muslims to expand eastwards. Expansion to the east which the Nazis in their time, claimed for Germany as the inevitable Drag Natch Osten’, has ominous forebodings for India. Pakistan is an ideological state, and not different from the ideological states, fascism, nazism and communism reared. India is on the frontline of the Muslim expansionist movements towards the east. The eruption of the military activity in Kargil, which Pakistan claimed was a part of the crusade in Kashmir, carried by the Muslim Mujahideen represented the Islamic international, should leave no one in doubt about its objectives. The Kargil war, is a part of the long war Pakistan is waging against India to grab the Jammu and Kashmir, with a measured purpose: the de-Sanskritisation of the Himalayan frontier to integrate the Himalayas in the Central Asian Complex, which is dominantly Muslim. The Islamisation of the warm Himalayan hinterland, would ensure the emergence of the Muslims as the main power in Central Asia. And once they establish their power over Central Asia, they will extend their sway over South Asia and South East Asia. Placed along the soft frontiers of Russia as well as the turbulent Muslim majority border states of Western China, including Sinkiang, they would be able to force a realignment of power in Asia. The de-Sanskritisation of the Himalayas is the most crucial achievement Pakistan seeks to accomplish. For if the Himalayas are lost, the entire northern India will lose its geo-strategic defences against the invasion from the north. Kargil is not an isolated act of military activity of Pakistan. For the ideological state of Pakistan, the soldiers of its army, the Afghan Taliban, the Sudanese and the Arab Mujahideen, are all pioneers of the Muslim crusade, indistinguishable from the Mujahidin raised from among the Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir. Kargil war is an integral part of the ideological war, which Pakistan has carried on against India for the last five decades. Crusade is the character of an ideological state and Muslim crusade in Jammu and Kashmir should be viewed as a real threat to the national security of India. Kargil is a warning of the growing danger, India is faced with in its north. Ideological crusades assume varied forms, and the liberation armies, which lead the crusades follow their own agenda. They are not subject to the civilisational values, which India claims to be the basis of its secularism. The genocide of Hindus and their ethnic cleansing from Kashmir has amply proved that END SIMMERING LADAKHBy Prof Hari OmIrrespective of their political leanings and religious beliefs, the Ladakhishad hailed the October 1989 tripartite agreement as the crowning triumph of their 47-year-long crusade, which included the threat of leaving India for Tibet to end the Kashmir valley’s hegemony over the State’s politics and economy. The agreement promised to achieve and exercise equal rights for Ladakhis with the Kashmiris in all spheres. Under the 1989 accord, the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council (LAHDC) was set up as a means to evolve and empower the Ladakhis to mould their future and compensate for their losses since 1947, owing to the discriminatory policies of the Kashmiri rulers. The belief of the Ladakhis that they would be armed with adequate powers to regenerate their socio-cultural and politico-economic life was not based on something abstract. It had stemmed from the President’s Act, 1995 itself, under which they were to obtain a modified dispensation. The language of the Act clearly stated that the LAHDC shall have unbridled “executive powers” to control fully the region’s land and administration, formulate and finalise the budget for the Leh area, generate employment and alleviate poverty, promote tourism in the cold desert, set up educational institutions and small-scale cottage industries, open up health centres etc. However, to say all this is not to suggest that everybody in Ladakh shared the same feeling that the President’s Act would harmonise inter-regional relations, and that the politics of confrontation between Ladakh and the Valley would become a story of the past. There was a section which then warned that the LAHDC was not a permanent solution to the kind of ills afflicting the Ladakhis. It stated that differences may surface again as soon as the President’s rule ended and power was transferred to the leaders in the Valley. In effect, this group told the Ladakhi Buddhist Association (LBA), who had been spearheading the “empower Ladakh movement”, that the key to the age-old Ladakhi problem lay not in a dispensation within the State but in a total segregation of the trans-Himalayan region from the Valley into nothing short of a “Union Territory status”. The developments in the Leh area after the end of President’s rule in 1996, leave no doubt whatsoever that the apprehensions expressed by the ardent believers in the concept of “Union Territory status” were legitimate. But some of the noteworthy things are the unambiguous resolve of well established political formations like the LBA, the LMA and the Congress, of taking extra-constitutional methods to revive their demand for Union Territory status. Total boycott of the officially organised Republic Day celebration at Leh in 1998 and 1999, massive strike throughout the Leh district in January 1999 and the rise of a feeling among comparatively more radical Ladakhis that they do not have any future in the present geographical dispensation are some of the disturbing developments in the recent past. All these developments point to the fact that the euphoria of 1989 and 1995 has given way to despair, and that a strong anti-Valley sentiment is sweeping the cold desert region. Known for its October 1989 unprecedented violence, these developments also suggest that the problem has serious dimensions. The question arises: what aggravated the Ladakhi political scene and provoked the people there to look beyond India? The most important of all reasons is what the Ladakhis call repudiation of their 13 immediate demands by the Valley’s “ruling elite”. They had even vehemently opposed New Delhi’s move of setting up an autonomous hill council at Leh, denouncing the step as a deliberate move to hurt the Kashmiri psyche and jeopardise the interests of the alienated people of the Valley. Some of the demands of the Ladakhis, which were put down by the Valley leaders were: A free hand to LAHDC to administer all the 45 subjects placed under its jurisdiction by the Presidential Order, 1995; Financial autonomy and more funds to the council to enable it to undertake developmental activities in the extremely backward area which remains cut off from the rest of the country for more than six months in a year; reversal of the policy being pursued by the Kashmiri leaders to undermine the authority of LAHDC and render it defunct; finalisation of some General Business Conduct Rules and Executive Council Rules; ratification of rules pertaining to land otherwise vested in the LAHDC and control over Government employees serving in the Leh district, including the Deputy Commissioner-cum-Chief Executive Officer of the Council; and implementation of the Master Plan notified three year ago. Besides this, they also demanded increase in the number of blocks in the Leh district from the existing five to nine; Cabinet Minister status to the chairman of the LAHDC on the Darjeeling pattern and minister of state status to its executive councillors; continuation of the pre-October 1996 practice under which the chairman of the Council used to take salute at Republic and Independence Day functions; reappointment of Bashrat Ahmad Dar as the Deputy Commissioner of Leh district, who was removed from office by the State government following boycott of the officially-held Republic Day celebrations by all Ladakhis; revision of the Councillors’ salary and allowances. It is obvious that the State government’s attitude towards the far off Ladakhis is apathetic and provocative. The fact is that it has practically wrecked the 1995 reform scheme as originally conceived and has systematically minimised the concessions made available to the Ladakhis to conciliate them and retrieve the situation in the sensitive border region. The generation of aggressive thinking among the Ladakhis has to be viewed in the context of the impatience with stagnation and an urge for developments as well as the difficulties which are created by the Valley-based leaders at every step and their unwillingness to shed off what may be termed as their archaic bias against non-Kashmiri. Chief Minister Dr Farooq Abdullah would do well to sit up and dispassionately review the political situation as it is developing in Leh and take appropriate steps to strengthen the LAHDC so that it is able to mitigate the hardships of the Ladakhis. The people of this region undoubtedly deserve a special treatment and extraordinary attention. For, they have been suffering since ages from abject poverty, illiteracy, endemic unemployment and, above all, depredations of the Valley rulers. Not to meet their demands (and these appear quite petty and non-preposterous) would be to play with dangerous tools in the sense that the suffering Ladakhis appear determined not to allow anyone to take |